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Editorial note
Koen Lenaerts*
LINKING EU CITIZENSHIP TO DEMOCRACY
1 Introduction
Introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, ‘citizenship of the Union 
is intended to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States’.1 A close reading of Articles 20 to 25 TFEU suggests that this 
fundamental status may be examined from three different, albeit closely 
related, perspectives. 
At international level, EU citizens benefit from the protection of EU 
law. EU citizenship is intended to promote the feeling of belonging to a 
community of values that stands up for all its citizens when they cross 
the external borders of the EU. That is why Article 23 TFEU states that, 
when travelling or residing abroad, any EU citizen enjoys, albeit only in 
the absence of national representation in the third country, the right to 
diplomatic and consular protection from all EU Member States. 
At Member State level, EU citizens who have exercised free move-
ment must feel part of the society of the host Member State. EU citizenship 
aims to promote a Europe without internal frontiers where all citizens 
can move freely and without suffering from any discrimination based on 
nationality.2 Bearing in mind that objective, the authors of the Treaty 
of Maastricht introduced into the Treaties Article 21 TFEU, by virtue of 
which the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Mem-
ber States is no longer conditional on the exercise of an economic activity 
in the host Member State.3 Furthermore, full integration could not take 
* President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Professor of European Union 
Law, University of Leuven. All opinions expressed herein are strictly personal to the author.
1 See, eg, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para 31; Case C-413/99 Baum-
bast and R ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, para 82; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, 
para 22; Case C‑200/02 Zhu and Chen ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para 25; Case C-135/08 Rott-
mann ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, para 43; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, 
para 41; Case C-434/09 McCarthy ECLI:EU:C:2011:277, para 47; Case C‑256/11 Dereci 
and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, para 62; and Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O 
and Others ECLI:EU:C:2012:776, para 44.
2 Article 18 TFEU.
3 Baumbast (n 1) para 81 (‘[a]lthough, before the Treaty on European Union entered into 
force, the [ECJ] had held that that right of residence, conferred directly by the EC Treaty, 
was subject to the condition that the person concerned was carrying on an economic activ-
ity within the meaning of [the fundamental freedoms], it is none the less the case that, since 
then, Union citizenship has been introduced into the EC Treaty and Article [21(1) TFEU] 
has conferred a right, for every citizen, to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States’).
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place without at least some degree of political participation and represen-
tation. Accordingly, those same authors also introduced into the Treaties 
Article 22(1) TFEU, which confers on every citizen of the Union residing 
in a Member State of which he is not a national the right to vote and to 
stand as candidates in municipal elections in that Member State. 
Last but not least, at EU level, EU citizens are seen as political actors. 
EU citizenship reflects the idea that the process of European integration 
must be not only in the hands of the Member States but also in those of 
the peoples of Europe.4 In that sense, it contributes to the democratisa-
tion of the EU. That is why any EU citizen is entitled to have his say in 
the governance of the European Union. In that regard, Article 22(2) TFEU 
provides that every EU citizen residing in a Member State of which he is 
not a national is to have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he 
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. Moreover, 
any EU citizen has, in accordance with Article 24 TFEU, the right to hold 
the EU institutions to account, notably by addressing questions to them 
in any of the official Treaty languages and by obtaining a reply in the 
same language. Likewise, that Treaty provision also states that EU citi-
zens enjoy the right to petition the European Parliament in accordance 
with Article 227 TFEU and the right to apply to the Ombudsman in ac-
cordance with Article 228 TFEU.5 In addition, whilst EU governance is 
based on representative democracy,6 the authors of the Treaty of Lisbon 
decided to incorporate into the EU legal order a form of participative de-
mocracy. In that regard, the first paragraph of Article 24 TFEU provides 
that the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt a regulation 
laying down the procedures and conditions required for a citizens’ initia-
tive within the meaning of Article 11 [TEU].7 
However, a close look at the new Treaty provisions on democratic 
principles and at the Treaty provisions on the European Parliament re-
veals that the political dimension of EU citizenship is not limited to the 
political rights attaching to the status of EU citizen.8 This is because 
4 See Article 10 TEU.
5 See Case C‑261/13 P Schönberger v Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2014:2423.
6 Article 10(1) TEU states that ‘[t]he functioning of the Union shall be founded on repre-
sentative democracy’.
7 Article 11(4) TEU states that ‘[n]ot less than one million citizens who are nationals of a 
significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Com-
mission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters 
where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of imple-
menting the Treaties’. As to the regulation to which the first paragraph of Article 24 TFEU 
refers, see Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative [2011] OJ L65/1.
8 As to the Treaty provisions on democratic principles, see Articles 9 to 12 TEU. As to the 
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those rights do not fully capture the link between EU citizenship and the 
democratic governance of the EU. Respect for the principle of representa-
tive democracy on which the functioning of the EU is founded requires 
both the EU institutions and the Member States to fulfil democratic obli-
gations that are to be found not only in Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU, 
but also in other provisions of the Treaties and secondary EU law that 
relate to the democratic governance of the EU. In fulfilling those obliga-
tions, the EU institutions and the Member States must comply with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), 
including the provisions thereof that relate to EU citizenship9 but do not 
correspond to the rights listed in Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU.
Looking at the seminal ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
in Delvigne,10 this editorial is to shed some light on the link between EU 
citizenship and the democratic governance of the EU.11 To that end, it is 
divided into three parts. Part 2 is devoted to examining that case. For the 
present purposes, Delvigne contains two main findings. First, the ECJ 
made explicit, for the first time, the link between EU citizenship and EU 
representative democracy. Second, it rejected a broad interpretation of 
Article 20(2)(b) TFEU. In so doing, the ECJ refused to support the view 
that fundamental rights may be incorporated into the political rights at-
taching to the status of EU citizen by means of judicial interpretation. 
Exploring further this second finding, Part 3 is to provide additional con-
stitutional arguments militating against such incorporation. Last but not 
least, a brief conclusion supports the contention that, as interpreted in 
Delvigne, the political dimension of EU citizenship is respectful of the 
constitutional allocation of powers sought by the authors of the Treaties. 
2 Linking EU citizenship to EU representative democracy 
As political actors, EU citizens are called upon to play an important 
role in the democratic functioning of the EU. This follows from the Treaty 
provisions on ‘democratic principles’ newly introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Notably, Article 10(3) TEU states that ‘[e]very citizen shall have 
the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union’. That participa-
tion is primarily carried out by means of electing the members of the Eu-
Treaty provisions on the European Parliament, see Article 14 TEU and Articles 223 to 234 
TFEU. See A Schrauwen, ‘European Union Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change 
at All?’ (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 55, 56 (noting that 
‘the political dimension refers to how [EU] citizens participate in the EU decision-making 
structure, to the way in which the [EU] should treat its citizens and to how the [EU] citizens 
can legitimize the [EU]’). 
9 See Title V of the Charter.
10 Case C-650/13 Delvigne ECLI:EU:C:2015:648.
11 See L Khadar and J Shaw, ‘Article 39 of the Charter’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2014) 1038.
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tation of the interests of EU citizens. As Article 10(2) TEU provides, ‘[EU 
c]itizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parlia-
ment’. The direct democratic mandate with which EU citizens vest mem-
bers of the European Parliament was made crystal clear by the authors 
of the Treaty of Lisbon who decided to abandon the wording of ex Article 
189 EC. Whilst the latter Treaty provision referred to the members of 
the European Parliament as ‘representatives of the peoples of the States 
brought together in the Community’, Article 14(2) TEU refers to them as 
‘representatives of the Union’s citizens’.12 In order to facilitate the demo-
cratic participation and representation of EU citizens at EU level, EU law 
imposes obligations on both the EU institutions and the Member States. 
As to the EU institutions, they must, for example, give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly 
exchange their views in all fields of EU activity. They also have the ob-
ligation to take decisions as openly and as close as possible to the citi-
zen. In particular, the principle of transparency enables EU citizens to 
participate fully in the EU decision-making process. By having access to 
adequate information on the decisions adopted by the EU legislator and 
by the EU administration, EU citizens may engage in a discussion as to 
whether they agree or disagree with those decisions. At the same time, 
transparency enhances the legitimacy of the EU institutions, given that 
their actions (or their failures to act) are open to public scrutiny.13 The 
right of access to documents gives concrete expression to that principle.14
In addition, whilst the functioning of the EU is founded on represen-
tative democracy, it also allows EU citizens, acting collectively, to take 
the initiative to propose EU legislation.15 Furthermore, it allows room for 
12 See the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Case C‑650/13 Delvigne ECLI:EU:C:2015:363, 
para 100.
13 See Case C‑615/13 P ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA ECLI:EU:C:2015:489, para 
56 (‘[t]he transparency of the process followed by [an EU] public authority for the adop-
tion of [an EU] measure contributes to that authority acquiring greater legitimacy in the 
eyes of the persons to whom that measure is addressed and increasing their confidence in 
that authority […] and to ensuring that the authority is more accountable to citizens in a 
democratic system’). See, to that effect, Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden 
and Turco v Council ECLI:EU:C:2008:374, paras 45 and  59; Case C-506/08 P Sweden v 
MyTravel and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2011:496, para 113; Case C-280/11 P Council v Ac-
cess Info Europe ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, para 32; and Case C-350/12 P Council v in’t Veld 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039, paras 53, 106 and 107).
14 See, eg, Sweden and Turco (n 13) para 34; Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and 
C-532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission ECLI:EU:C:2010:541, para  68; and 
Sweden v MyTravel and Commission (n 13) para 72. See also K Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of 
Democracy in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ (2013) 62 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 271, 300.
15 See, in this regard, Case T‑450/12 Anagnostakis v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2015:739 
and Case C-589/15 P Anagnostakis v Commission (pending).
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alternative forms of governance in certain fields, such as the adoption of 
norms that are the product of a social dialogue at EU level.16
As to the Member States, Article 22(2) TFEU, which contains the 
legal basis for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the exercise of 
the right set out in Article 20(2)(b) TFEU, states that EU citizens are to 
be free from any discrimination on grounds of nationality when they ex-
ercise their right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the 
European Parliament. In Eman and Sevinger, the ECJ explicitly held that 
‘Article [22(2) TFEU] is confined to applying the principle of non-discrim-
ination on grounds of nationality to [the] right to vote and [to] stand [as 
a candidate in elections to the European Parliament], by stipulating that 
every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a 
national is to have [that right] in the Member State in which he resides, 
under the same conditions as nationals of that State’. 17
In that regard, the question that arises is whether EU law imposes 
on the Member States other obligations with regard to the participation 
and representation of EU citizens in the governance of the EU, notably by 
guaranteeing the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to 
the European Parliament in the Member State of which the EU citizen is 
a national. The ECJ was confronted with that very question in Delvigne.18 
The facts of that case are as follows. In 1988, Mr Delvigne – a French 
national residing in France – was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment 
for the crime of murder. As an ancillary consequence of that sentence, 
French criminal law provided that persons in Mr Delvigne’s situation 
were deprived of their right to vote. In 2012, French authorities decided, 
in application of the French Electoral Code and French criminal law, to 
exclude Mr Delvigne from the electoral roll. He challenged that decision 
before the referring court which asked, in essence, whether Article 39 of 
the Charter had to be interpreted as precluding such exclusion. 
At the outset, the ECJ examined whether the relevant provisions of 
French law on the basis of which Mr Delvigne was excluded from the elec-
toral roll ‘implemented EU law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter. In that regard, the ECJ noted that Article 8 of the 1976 Act con-
cerning the elections of members to the European Parliament (the ‘1976 
Act’) states that ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act, the electoral proce-
dure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions’.19 
16 Lenaerts (n 14) 298. See Case T‑135/96 UEAPME v Council ECLI:EU:T:1998:128.
17 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger ECLI:EU:C:2006:545, para 53 (emphasis added).
18  Delvigne (n 10).
19 Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct univer-
sal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 
1976 [1976] OJ L278/1, as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 
June 2002 and 23 September 2002 [2002] OJ L283/1.
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Referring to its previous case law,20 it held that Articles 1(3) and 8 
of the 1976 Act do not define, expressly and precisely, who is entitled to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament. 
That is a competence that remains with the Member States.21 
However, Member States must, when exercising that competence, 
fulfil their obligation under Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act, read in conjunc-
tion with Article 14(3) TEU, according to which ‘[t]he members of the 
European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct 
universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot’.22 The ECJ reasoned that a 
Member State is fulfilling its obligations under those provisions when it 
adopts legislation to that effect even where the latter deprives an EU citi-
zen from his right to vote in the elections to the European Parliament. In 
so doing, such a Member State is implementing EU law within the mean-
ing of Article 51(1) of the Charter.23
Next, the ECJ examined which of the two paragraphs of Article 39 
of the Charter applied to the case at hand.24 In the light of the explana-
tions relating to that provision of the Charter,25 it noted that, whilst Ar-
ticle 39(1) of the Charter corresponds to the right guaranteed in Article 
20(2)(b) TFEU,26 Article 39(2) of the Charter corresponds to Article 14(3) 
TEU. Those explanations also state that ‘Article 39(2) takes over the basic 
principles of the electoral system in a democratic State’. In accordance 
with Article 52(2) of the Charter,27 the ECJ held that, since Article 20(2)
(b) TFEU was not applicable to a situation such as that of Mr Delvigne, 
the same applied to Article 39(1) of the Charter.28 Thus, the compatibility 
with EU law of the French legislation at issue had to be examined in the 
light of Article 39(2) of the Charter. 
20 Eman and Sevinger (n 17), paras 43 and 45; and Case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:543, paras  70 and 78.
21 Delvigne (n 10) para 31.
22 ibid, para 32.
23 ibid, para 33.
24 Article 39 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to 
the European Parliament’, states that: ‘1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which 
he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. 2. Members of the 
European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.’
25 See the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17 
(‘the explanations relating to the Charter’).
26 It is worth noting that the explanations relating to Article 39(1) of the Charter state that 
Article 22 TFEU contains the legal basis for the adoption of detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right set out in Article 20(2)(b) TFEU.
27 Article 52(2) of the Charter states that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which pro-
vision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits 
defined by those Treaties’.
28 Delvigne (n 10) paras 42 and 43.
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Once it had been established that the French legislation at issue 
constituted a limitation on the exercise of the right to vote in elections to 
the European Parliament as provided for in Article 39(2) of the Charter, 
the ECJ went on to determine whether such a limitation complied with 
the requirements laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. The ECJ ob-
served that it did, since the exclusion to which Mr Delvigne was subject 
was provided for by law,29 respected the essence of that right,30 pursued 
a legitimate objective and complied with the principle of proportionality.31 
Delvigne is an important development in the case law of the ECJ. 
It has helped to make explicit the link between EU citizenship and the 
democratic governance of the EU. It shows that the political dimension of 
EU citizenship is not limited to Articles 20 to 25 TFEU, but also involves 
other provisions of EU law, notably Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) 
of the 1976 Act. Those provisions impose on the Member States obliga-
tions whose objective is to ensure that the basic principles inherent in a 
democratic electoral system are applied at EU level. In addition, Delvigne 
supports the view that fundamental rights may not be incorporated into 
the substantive rights attaching to the status of EU citizen by means 
of judicial interpretation. The scope ratione personae of Article 20(2)(b) 
TFEU was left untouched. Rather, in fulfilling the obligations imposed by 
Article 14(3) TEU and the 1976 Act, Member States must comply with the 
Charter, in particular with the provisions set out under its Title V that do 
not correspond to the rights listed in Article 20(2) TFEU. 
3 The incorporation of rights other than those listed in Article 20(2) 
TFEU
It follows from the ruling of the ECJ in Delvigne that fundamental 
rights may not be ‘incorporated’ into the political rights attaching to the 
status of EU citizen. Otherwise, the system of fundamental rights pro-
tection under EU law would serve as a ‘federalising device’, since those 
rights would apply on a ‘free-standing’ basis, ie regardless of whether the 
national measure at issue adversely affects the rights attaching to that 
status. 32 In order for a national measure to fall within the scope of those 
rights, it would then suffice for that measure to infringe any fundamental 
right recognised in the Charter. 
One can draw important lessons from the US constitutional experi-
ence.33 In the US, the Bill of Rights set out in the Federal Constitution has 
29 ibid, para 47.
30 ibid, para 48.
31 ibid, paras 49-51.
32 See K Lenaerts, ‘The Concept of EU Citizenship in the Case Law of the European Court 
of Justice’ (2012) 13 ERA Forum 569, 577-579.
33 See also K Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ (2000) 25 EL Rev 575.
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operated as a centripetal force which protects individuals from the ille-
gitimate interference of public power, whether of federal or state origin.34 
Thus, the Privileges or Immunities Clause and, notably, the Due Process 
Clause of the XIVth Amendment have served as the gateway for the ap-
plication of the Bill of Rights to the American States.35 According to some 
scholars, Article 20 TFEU could likewise provide the legal basis for an EU 
variant of the incorporation doctrine,36 as this Treaty provision, having 
stated that ‘[c]itizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to 
the duties provided for in the Treaties’, goes on to enumerate those rights 
on a non-exhaustive basis. The argument then runs that the status of EU 
citizen contains more rights than those set out in Articles 21 to 24 TFEU 
so that, emulating the US Supreme Court, the ECJ should rely on Article 
20 TFEU with a view to attaching fundamental rights to that status. 
In that regard, some scholars have advocated a ‘reverse Solange 
doctrine’ according to which national measures that do not implement 
EU law fall outside the scope of that law as long as they do not consti-
tute systemic violations of fundamental rights. Where, however, national 
measures do give rise to such systemic violations, those scholars argue 
that, by virtue of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, EU citizens 
enjoy a judicially enforceable EU law right to protection from those viola-
tions, regardless of whether they move or remain in their Member State 
of origin.37 That would create ‘a common minimum level of fundamental 
rights protection throughout the EU’. The idea would thus be to protect 
not only the individual but also the ‘constitutional core’ of the EU which 
comprises, at the very least, the values set out in Article 2 TEU. 
However, such an incorporation doctrine ‘à l’européenne’, even if 
limited to ‘systemic violations’, would mean that fundamental rights pro-
34 The Bill of Rights (Ist to Xth Amendments of the US Constitution) was originally conceived 
as a limit on the powers of the federal government but not those of the American States. 
The reason was that the majority of the founding fathers believed that the application of 
the Bill of Rights to the American States would give leverage to the federal government to 
encroach upon State powers not transferred to the Union. See, generally, E Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law (4th edn, Kluwer 2011). For an excellent study on US-EU comparative 
law regarding fundamental rights, see A Knook, ‘The Court, the Charter, and the Vertical 
Division of Powers in the European Union’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 367. 
35 The Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause read as follows: ‘No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law’. 
36 In favour of applying the US incorporation doctrine to an EU context, see M van den 
Brink, ‘EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights: Taking EU Citizenship Rights Seri-
ously?’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 273, 287-288 (who advocates follow-
ing the example of the US Supreme Court, whilst allowing Member States to opt for a higher 
level of protection).
37 A von Bogdandy et al, ‘Reverse Solange: Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights 
Against EU Member States’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 489. See also D Kochenov et al (eds), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (CUP, forthcoming).
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tection under EU law would apply to national measures falling outside 
the scope of application of EU law, thus having the same scope as that of 
national constitutions or of the ECHR. That outcome would be incompat-
ible with the principle of conferral, as it adversely affects the allocation of 
powers between the EU and its Member States sought by the authors of 
the Treaties.38 
It is worth recalling that the principle of conferral affects the exercise 
of powers within the EU in two different but related ways. On the one 
hand, it limits the fields in which EU action can be undertaken.39 On the 
other hand, it ensures that the EU will refrain from acting in a way that 
renders the powers retained by the Member States devoid of substance.40 
If, however, all national measures, regardless of their substantive link 
to EU law, had to pass muster under the Charter, that would seriously 
undermine the powers retained by the Member States, notwithstanding 
the principle of conferral.41 
As I have explained elsewhere, the Charter is the ‘shadow’ of EU law. 
Just as an object defines the contours of its shadow, the scope of EU 
law determines that of the Charter.42 Article 51(1) of the Charter must be 
interpreted as meaning that it is the scope of EU law that defines that of 
the Charter, and not the other way around.43 An incorporation doctrine 
‘à l’européenne’ is simply incompatible with the rationale underpinning 
Article 51(1) of the Charter, by virtue of which recourse to fundamental 
rights cannot be invoked to broaden the substantive scope of EU law. 
38 Referring to the Opinion of AG Sharpston in Ruiz Zambrano, see P Van Elsuwege, ‘Shift-
ing the Boundaries? European Union Citizenship and the Scope of Application of EU Law 
— Case No C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi’ (2011) 38 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 263, 267 (who argues that ‘this proposal suggests a Coper-
nican revolution within the EU’s legal and political system, comparable to the impact of 
Gitlow v New York on American constitutional law’).
39 See Article 5(2) TEU: ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain 
the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States’.
40 See Article 4(1) TEU: ‘[i]n accordance with Article 5 [TEU], competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’.
41 However, see van den Brink (n 36) 283, who posits that ‘it is […] not the Charter but EU 
citizenship that has changed the field of application of Union law. Since EU fundamental 
rights could always be applied in situations falling within the scope of Union law, they 
would still be applicable if EU citizenship extends the scope of EU law’. However, in my 
view, this argument is circular given that it is by having recourse to the Charter that new 
rights attaching to the status of citizen of the Union would be created, hence expanding the 
scope of application of EU law.
42 K Lenaerts and JA Gutiérrez–Fons, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional 
Edifice’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 
(Hart Publishing 2014) 1567-1568.
43 Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 19.
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That said, that incompatibility does not, however, rule out the possibil-
ity that other provisions of EU law may give rise to obligations on the 
Member States that relate to the political dimension of EU citizenship 
but are not set out in Articles 20(2), 22(2) and 24 TFEU. In fulfilling those 
EU law obligations, the Member States must, of course, comply with the 
Charter.44
Article 52(2) of the Charter, which states that ‘[r]ights recognised by 
[the] Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’, also 
opposes an incorporation doctrine ‘à l’européenne’. In that regard, the 
explanations relating to that Article of the Charter, which expressly men-
tion ‘the rights derived from Union citizenship’, state that ‘[t]he Charter 
does not alter the system of rights conferred by the EC Treaty and taken 
over by the Treaties’. This means that the Charter may not be relied upon 
as a device which expands or grants new rights to EU citizens. This was 
actually what the ECJ did in Delvigne: compliance with Article 52(2) of 
the Charter means that the scope of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU determines 
that of Article 39(1) of the Charter. Since the former provision did not ap-
ply to a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the latter 
did not apply either.45 Conversely, given that Article 14(3) TEU applied 
to the case at hand, the same held true for Article 39(2) of the Charter. 
As mentioned above, it is thus the Treaty provision that corresponds to 
a fundamental right recognised in the Charter that determines the scope 
of application of that fundamental right, and not the other way around. 
Furthermore, the incorporation of fundamental rights into the sta-
tus of EU citizen may not be judicially driven, since Article 25(2) TFEU 
clearly states that: 
without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, 
the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or 
to add to the rights listed in Article 20(2) [TFEU]. These provi-
sions shall enter into force after their approval by the Mem-
ber States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
It follows that Article 25(2) TFEU incorporates a double ‘political 
safeguard of federalism’.46 First, it safeguards Member States as a whole, 
44 Delvigne (n 10) para 33.
45 ibid, paras 40 to 43.
46 Term borrowed from H Wechsler, ‘The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Ro1e of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government’ (1954) 54 Columbia 
Law Review 543.
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since unanimity voting is required within the Council. Second, Article 
25(2) TFEU also protects national parliaments and even the peoples of 
Europe themselves where their consent to such measures is required by 
their national constitution. Additionally, Article 25(2) TFEU applies ‘with-
out prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties’, notably Article 6(1) 
TEU which states that ‘[t]he provisions of the Charter shall not extend in 
any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties’. Accord-
ingly, the political incorporation of new rights (or the strengthening of 
the rights already listed in Article 20(2) TFEU) to the status of EU citizen 
would have to comply with the prohibition laid down in Article 6(1) TEU.
An incorporation doctrine would also be inconsistent with the objec-
tives sought by the authors of the Treaties. In particular, it would run 
counter to the fact that, in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, the EU 
is committed to respecting the national identity of the Member States, 
of which national constitutional arrangements are part and parcel.47 An 
incorporation doctrine ‘à l’européenne’ would inevitably face opposition 
from national constitutional courts which would undermine the legiti-
macy of the ECJ. Even if limited to systemic failures, it would send the 
message that national constitutional courts are unable to fulfil the very 
mission for which they were created, ie to protect a sphere of self-deter-
mination at national level free from public interference. Since the rela-
tionship between the ECJ and national courts is based not on hierarchy 
but on cooperation and mutual respect, any breakdown in trust will lead 
not to submissive obedience on the part of national constitutional courts, 
but rather to resistance and conflict.48 Outside the scope of application 
of EU law, the authors of the Treaties have entrusted the EU’s political 
institutions, not the ECJ, with the task of monitoring whether ‘there is a 
clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to 
in Article 2 [TEU]’. In accordance with Article 269 TFEU, the role of the 
ECJ is, by contrast, limited to verifying that the procedural stipulations 
laid down in Article 7 TEU have been met.
4 Concluding remarks
The ruling of the ECJ in Delvigne demonstrates that the political 
dimension of EU citizenship is not fully captured by the political rights 
attaching to the status of EU citizen. Respect for the principle of repre-
sentative democracy may require both the EU institutions and the Mem-
ber States to fulfil obligations that are not to be found in Articles 20(2), 
22(2) and 24 TFEU, but in other provisions of the Treaties and secondary 
47 See Case C‑208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein ECLI:EU:C:2010:806, para 92.
48 See also K Lenaerts, ‘Kooperation und Spannung im Verhältnis von EuGH und nation-
alen Verfassungsgerichten’ (2015) 50 Europarecht 3.
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EU law that give concrete expression to democratic principles. Those ob-
ligations may seek to incorporate into the EU legal order basic electoral 
principles that are part and parcel of European democracies.49
Notably, by virtue of those electoral principles, the Member States 
are bound to ensure that members of the European Parliament are elect-
ed by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. That is so even 
in respect of EU citizens who are nationals. This shows that EU citizen-
ship is linked to the democratic governance of the EU. As political actors, 
EU citizens who effectively participate in elections to the European Par-
liament contribute to strengthening the democratic credentials of the EU. 
Thus, the political dimension of EU citizenship is not only about rights, 
but also about ensuring that representative democracy at EU level is ef-
fective and, most importantly, legitimate. 
Moreover, Delvigne illustrates the fact that the scope of the political 
rights attaching to the status of EU citizen may not be expanded via judi-
cial interpretation, notably by incorporating fundamental rights into that 
status. In particular, the scope of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU is limited to giving 
concrete expression to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality as applied to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament. Consequently, that provision may 
not, as the ECJ ruled in Eman and Sevinger, be relied upon by an EU 
citizen against the Member State of which he is a national. 
As interpreted in Delvigne, the political dimension of EU citizenship 
is respectful of the constitutional framework set out in the Treaties. This 
is because the ECJ grounded the obligation to ensure that members of the 
European Parliament are elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and 
secret ballot in the EU principle of representative democracy – as given 
concrete expression in Article 1(3) of the 1976 Act and Article 14(3) TEU. 
It did so, whilst leaving the scope of Article 20(2)(b) TFEU untouched. 
Since the national measure at issue ‘implemented’ that obligation within 
the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, the ECJ was right to examine 
whether that measure complied with Article 52(1) of the Charter. This 
shows that, contrary to what an incorporation doctrine ‘à l’européenne’ 
would have entailed, the ECJ gave impetus to the political dimension of 
EU citizenship without extending in any way the competences of the EU 
as defined in the Treaties. 
49 See the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in Delvigne (n 12), para 98 (holding that ‘elections 
to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage meant at all events that the com-
position of that chamber would be the image and reflection of that of the parliaments of the 
Member States’).
